Global Imbalances-Just How Dangerous? by Bruce Little & Robert Lafrance
3 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
• Growing current account surpluses in Asia
and among oil-exporting countries, alongside
a growing current account deficit in the
United States, have raised concerns that such
imbalances pose a threat to the world
economy, especially if they are reversed in a
disorderly manner.
• A related worry is that surplus savings in
emerging-market economies are financing the
U.S. deficit instead of supporting investment
and growth in these emerging-market
economies.
• Experts are divided on the gravity of this
situation. Some believe that normal market
forces will resolve these imbalances over time;
others argue that policy-makers should
facilitate the adjustment with policies that
curb domestic demandin deficitcountriesand
stimulate it in surplus countries.
• The most likely outcome is an orderly
transition back to a more “normal” situation,
especially if market forces are allowed to work,
but the longer these imbalances persist, the
greater the risk of asharper reversalthat could
destabilize the world economy and undermine
growth. There is also a danger that some
countries might resort to policies of trade
protectionism to reduce the imbalances.
*Bruce Little is a former economics columnist and writer for The Globe
and Mail.
naworldeconomythatincreasinglyinterweaves
the fortunes of all countries, concerns have arisen
overthephenomenonknownasglobalimbalances.
That major imbalances exist is almost unques-
tioned, although there are a few skeptics; however, the
nature, extent, and urgency of the risk that imbalances
pose to global economic growth and ﬁnancial stability
is less clear. These features automatically make global
imbalances an ideal subject for the hundreds of studies,
reports, articles, speeches, and conferences, both public
and private, that have been devoted to the myriad
issues surrounding them. For the most part, debate
has been limited to the international organizations,
central banks, academics, and other analysts who follow
thesequestionsmostclosely.Buttheissuesareimportant
enough, and the potential consequences serious enough,
that a broader public understanding is important.
Whenwetalkaboutglobalimbalances,wearereferring
to the current account deficit of the United States
and the offsetting current account surpluses of many
emerging-market countries in Asia and of oil-exporting
countries. Both are large and growing. In 2005, the
United States ran an external deﬁcit of US$805 billion,
double its 2001 level and equal to about 6 per cent of
its gross domestic product (GDP), while China had a
surplus of US$159 billion, or 7.1 per cent of its GDP.
Substantial surpluses can also be found in several East
Asianandoil-producingcountries(Chart1).Successive
annual surpluses have allowed Asian countries to
accumulate over US$2 trillion in foreign exchange
reserves, with China alone holding US$875 billion at
the end of February, when it overtook Japan to become
the world’s largest holder of reserves.
This is not normal. Until this decade, the world tended
to stay in rough balance. Current account balances
in absolute terms—ignoring the plus and minus
signs and focusing solely on the numbers—ranged
from 2 per cent of world GDP to just over 3 per cent.
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against many other currencies) and perhaps even a
revival of trade protectionism that would choke off
ordinary trade flows. It goes almost without saying
that policy-makers in general would like to avoid such
an outcome. In the main, however, they have been
reluctant to adopt policies to address the issue, prefer-
ring in many cases to point the ﬁnger of blame else-
where.
How this ends matters to all countries. The latest wave
of globalization has integrated emerging-market econo-
mies (EMEs)—notably China and India—into the glo-
bal economy, spreading the gains from trade more
widely than ever before. Economic globalization has
been beneﬁcial, notably in reducing poverty rates in
Asia. It has fostered increased competition and has
allowed more countries to beneﬁt from their compara-
tive advantages in world markets. At the same time,
ﬁnancial globalization has stimulated foreign invest-
ment and a broader and more efﬁcient allocation of
savings. More countries now have more to lose from a
major disruption. Canada has a special stake in the
outcome, since international trade has always been a
keysourceofthiscountry’sdevelopmentandprosperity.
As a trading nation with a more open economy than
most, Canada feels the impact of anything that affects
the health of the global economy.
Anyone who has tried to follow the global imbalances
discussion knows that there are wide, and often deep,
divides among researchers and opinion leaders on the
key questions, so it is often difﬁcult to keep these dis-
parate views in perspective. Our goal in this article is
Chart 2
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Since 2002, however, absolute balances have
climbed from 3.6 per cent to over 5 per cent of glo-
bal output (Chart 2). The size of today’s imbalances and
their recent growth have set off a vigorous debate. The
conclusion of almost every analysis—there are
exceptions, as we shall see—is that such imbalances
are unsustainable, a word whose meaning is best
captured in the memorable aphorism of the late U.S.
economist Herb Stein: “If something cannot go on
forever, it will stop” (Greenspan 2000).
What fuels the debate over global imbalances is disa-
greement on almost all the important questions. What
caused the sudden emergence of wide imbalances?
When will they stop growing—sooner or later? What
will stop them—underlying economic forces, govern-
ment policy action, nervous financial markets, or a
combination of all three? How will they stop—gradually
or abruptly? What harm can be attributed to imbal-
ances and what damage might a reversal cause? Who
will beneﬁt and who will lose?
The ofﬁcial international community has entered the
debate repeatedly through a wide range of organiza-
tions, such as the G–7 major industrialized nations, the
broader G–20, and the International Monetary and
Financial Committee of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). All have raised concerns that the inevitable
shrinkingoflargecurrentaccountsurplusesanddeficits,
when it comes, might seriously undermine global
economic growth. A disruptive adjustment would
involve the sudden realignments of major currencies
(marked by a steep depreciation of the U.S. dollar
Chart 1
Current Account Balances by Region, 2005
Billions of US$
* Asian NIEs = Asian newly industrialized economies
** Fuel DC = Fuel-exporting developing countries;
Non-Fuel DC = Non-Fuel-exporting developing countries
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2006
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to bridge that gap and offer an accessible guide to the
major issues and controversies.
Three Views of Global Imbalances
There are three main camps in this debate. The opti-
mistic view is that the global imbalances reﬂect deci-
sions—based on economic factors alone—by firms
and households that are increasingly integrated in a
global economy. From this perspective, the situation is
not very alarming because market forces will resolve
the imbalances over time in an orderly manner. What
is really needed is better research to understand how
technological, political, and market forces have inter-
acted to bring this situation about. The pessimistic
view is that policy-makers will fail to stimulate domestic
demand in countries with large current account sur-
pluses and to curb it in countries with large deficits,
thus increasing the probability, as Nouriel Roubini has
put it, “that the global rebalancing will be disorderly
and occur through a hard landing of the U.S. and the
global economy” (2005). A third group is cautiously
optimistic that the imbalances will be resolved in an
orderly fashion but worried that governments will not
encourage this outcome by removing distortions that
are thwarting market forces.
In this debate, there are optimists,
pessimists, and cautious optimists
who hope for an orderly resolution of
imbalances but worry that
governments will get in the way of
the outcome.
All three positions have champions among the academic
economists who take an interest in these issues. Most
international organizations, such as the IMF, the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), and the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), fall into the third group, as do many policy-
makers in countries like Canada. The key players,
notably the United States and China, appear to be less
concerned, or alternatively, more likely to seek policy
initiatives from other countries as being most useful to
resolve these imbalances. In the place of concrete policy
development, “one finds in the United States some-
thing between complacency and denial, and in the
rest of the world finger pointing and hand wringing”
(Truman 2005, 32). This is true to a point, but ﬁnger
pointing, complacency, and denial know no borders.
What Do We Mean by Global
Imbalances?
To understand better what is going on, we need both a
global and a local perspective, as well as an interpret-
ive framework.
Many people see the current account strictly through
the lens of the cross-border ﬂows of money tracked by
statistical agencies and reported quarterly in the media:
a deﬁcit country consumes more than it produces and
thus imports more than it exports, using the broadest
possible definitions of those terms; conversely, a surplus
country exports more than it imports. This approach is
valid, but incomplete. Saving and investment, which
does not show up directly in the popularly reported
data, plays a crucial role.
It works this way. The current account balance sum-
marizes a country's transactions with the rest of the
world over a period of time. It has two main compo-
nents. First, the trade balance represents the difference
between a country’s receipts for the goods and services
it exports and its payments for the goods and services
it imports. Second, the balance of net income receipts
tracks two smaller categories of cross-border receipts
and payments: one is the interest and dividends paid
on bonds and stocks held by people in other countries;
Chart 3
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buildings and machinery to increase their productive
capacity or to increase efﬁciency. Governments that
run fiscal deficits are, of course, net borrowers (or
dissavers). If those three groups collectively save less
than they invest, their country must turn to non-resi-
dents to make up the difference.
The Emergence of Major Imbalances
In the early 1990s, U.S. borrowing from the rest of the
world was relatively small because U.S. households
saved enough to finance most of the needs of firms
and governments (Chart 4). As the borrowing needs
of U.S. companies increased sharply towards the end
of the decade, and household savings fell, the need for
foreign savings rose, though the increase was modest
because governments were running surpluses—saving
instead of dissaving. By 2005, however, U.S. households,
firms, and governments alike had all become net
borrowers (Chart 4). Together, they were saving an
amount equal to 14 per cent of GDP, but investing
20 per cent of GDP. They made up that 6 percentage
point gap by importing capital from the rest of the
world.
Those imported savings, recorded in the United States’
capital account, are the ﬂip side of the current account
deficit, which could, according to some predictions,
grow from its present level of 6 per cent of GDP to as
much as 10 per cent in a few years. The deﬁcit is not
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the other involves ﬁnancial transactions like transfers
by individuals, most commonly when immigrants
send money to family members back in their home
countries. The current account, then, is a measure of
ﬂows—it follows regular movements of money across
borders. In the case of the United States (Chart 3), the
current account deﬁcit is driven almost entirely by a
large deﬁcit in the trade of goods and services.
When a country runs a current account deficit, its
receipts from international transactions of all kinds
are too small to cover its payments. In effect, the country
is spending more than it is earning and borrowing
from abroad to pay the difference. This is usually seen
from a consumption perspective; the country is con-
suming more than it is producing, and satisfies its
excess consumption with imported products, which it
pays for with money borrowed from foreigners. True
enough, but there is another way of saying the same
thing: the country is not saving enough of its current
production to meet its investment needs.1 This cannot
happen for the world economy as a whole. Savings
are the source of investment capital, and because the
planet is a closed economy, total savings must always
equal total investment.2
Since individual countries trade with each other, how-
ever, they can borrow and lend their savings. Countries
that save more than they invest at home (China, for
example) wind up with surplus savings, so they become
capital exporters and have current account surpluses.
Countries that invest more than they save domestically
(the United States, for example) have insufficient
savings, so they become capital importers and have
current account deﬁcits. The former are net national
savers; the latter, in the jargon of economics, are net
national dissavers, a word that does not trip lightly off
the tongue.
The concept of net national savings, the difference
between saving and investment, is sometimes difﬁcult
to grasp because it is the sum of net savings by three
groups—households, firms, and governments. Typically
in industrialized countries, households are net savers
inthattheysavemorethantheyinvest,whilecompanies
are net dissavers, since they borrow to invest in new
1.   A little math can show this. Let Y be national income (or gross domestic
product); C, total consumption; S, national savings (= income minus savings);
and FS, foreign savings. Then, for a closed economy: Y – C = S and Y – C = I,
or I = S; for an open economy: I = S + FS.
2.   While true in theory, it is a bit more difﬁcult to show this in ofﬁcial data.
Statistical agencies cannot track every transaction, so there are omissions and
errors.7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
States and large industrialized countries, but also in
terms of the capital flows it generates. In 2004, the
United States alone absorbed about 70 per cent of the
world's net international capital ﬂows; in other words,
of every dollar that savers worldwide were willing to
lend to people in other countries, 70 cents ended up in
the United States. Just to ﬁnance its savings shortfall,
the United States must now import more than US$65
billion a month—the savings of people outside the
United States—to pay its bills to the rest of the world.
The monthly data on those money flows are now
watched closely by ﬁnancial markets.
Traditionally, developing countries
have run current account deﬁcits and
used capital imported from wealthier
countries to ﬁnance their growth.
These days, that pattern is reversed:
developing countries are running
surpluses and exporting capital.
The size of the U.S. draw on the world’s pool of savings
is worrisome. Savings are the source of the investment
capital needed to ﬁnance economic growth and devel-
opment. In recent years, the bulk of internationally
mobile global net savings has been channelled to the
United States rather than to developing countries,
presumably because investors expected better returns
intheUnitedStates.Traditionally,developingcountries
have run current account deﬁcits and relied on capital
imported from wealthier countries to finance their
growth. This was Canada’s experience for many dec-
ades, and it is consistent with economic theory—
investment capital should flow to faster-growing
low-income countries from wealthier countries where
growth has slowed. These days, however, developing
countries—notably China and the oil-exporting coun-
tries—are running surpluses and exporting capital,
reversing the usual pattern.
Interest rates have assumed an important role in the
debate over global imbalances because they represent
the crossing point for supply and demand in the global
market for capital. More accurately, real interest rates
(that is, nominal rates adjusted for expected inﬂation)
reﬂect the interaction of saving and investment inten-
tions. If desired saving (the supply of capital) increases
more than desired investment (the demand for capi-
tal), then the real interest rate—the rental fee for funds
and the return on savings, if you like—falls. If inflation
rates are roughly the same in most countries, then low
interest rates can be interpreted as reﬂecting an excess
of global saving intentions over investment opportu-
nities. Recently, long-bond yields have been remarkably
low around the world (Chart 5). This has been particu-
larly perplexing in the United States—former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan called it a
“conundrum”—where a combination of strong eco-
nomic growth, large fiscal deficits, and sustained
tightening of monetary policy through rising short-term
ofﬁcial interest rates would normally have resulted in
higher yields. From a global perspective, however,
low long-bond interest rates, in real terms, can be
explained by an "excess" of desired global saving over
desired global investment.
The Excess-Savings Story
What, then, is behind these excess savings? Advanced
countries, EMEs, and oil-producing nations alike have
their own reasons to save more. In advanced economies,
one important driver appears to be a widespread
restructuring of corporate balance sheets following
the collapse of stock market bubbles in 2001. Corporate
proﬁts are high, yet ﬁrms have preferred on the whole
to distribute proﬁts, buy back their shares, and reduce
Chart 5
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their debt load, rather than invest heavily in new ven-
tures. This relative reluctance to invest reﬂects several
factors. Firms have turned prudent after coming under
greater public scrutiny in the wake of corporate scan-
dals.Strategiesforspendingoninformationtechnology
equipment have become more cautious following the
splurge of overinvestment—extreme in some cases—
associated with Y2K and the telecom and dot.com
bubbles.
In many industrialized countries (less so in the United
States), the story might also involve aging populations.
Some countries have been saving more to meet the
retirement needs of the baby-boom generation, the
oldest of whom have just turned 60. Yet there may be
fewer investment opportunities at home in economies
that are less dynamic than those with younger popu-
lations. Saving has exceeded investment in Japan for
the past quarter-century and—to a lesser extent—in
the euro area for most of the past 20 years.
EMEs have their own reasons to make a bigger contri-
bution to global savings. Many Asian nations that
boomed in the mid-1990s experienced recessions
following the currency crises of the late 1990s. Their
recovery strategy—chosen freely or out of necessity
and often at the urging of the international commu-
nity—has been to reduce domestic expenditures and
generate current account surpluses, making them net
suppliers of funds. Even non-crisis countries like China
began to accumulate foreign exchange reserves as a
precautionary measure. Having been burned them-
selves, or seen their close neighbours burned, they
have built “war chests” of foreign exchange reserves
to protect themselves from a sudden outflow of capital.
The recent rapid rise in oil prices has also contributed
to higher global savings. Oil producers, many of which
learned some hard lessons in the 1980s when they
squandered their sudden oil wealth, have been unwill-
ing—and to some extent unable—to spend their rising
revenues as fast as they accumulate them.
It is possible, then, to argue that low long-term real
interest rates can be largely explained by a combina-
tion of forces that created a signiﬁcant increase in the
global supply of savings—a “global saving[s] glut,” to
use the term popularized by Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben Bernanke. Broadly speaking, this is the
view of the optimists in the global imbalances debate.
This story has some appeal in the United States,
because it means the current account deﬁcits can be
seen, not in the negative light of U.S. overspending
and undersaving, but as a positive reflection of its
greater growth potential and of the lack of investment
opportunities outside the United States. The United
States is simply buying now (and absorbing more
imports) with the prospect of paying later (because
the U.S. economy, widely regarded as more productive
than most, is likely to grow faster than other industri-
alized countries in the future). When stock markets
crashed in 2001–02, an expansionary monetary policy
kept interest rates low and encouraged a surge in
the building and buying of homes, which created
opportunities for capital gains in the housing market.
Rebounding equity markets delivered a further rise in
household wealth. These gains, combined with low
interest rates, encouraged low private saving at a time
when the fiscal balance was deteriorating. In effect,
households saw their wealth increasing as their homes
appreciated in value, so they saw less need to save.
Financial globalization played a role by facilitating the
growth of the U.S. current account deficit in three ways.
First, it increased the pool of international savings that
could be used to ﬁnance the deﬁcit. Second, it reduced
the degree of home bias in portfolio investments.
Traditionally, most savers invested the bulk of their
money in their own countries, so there was a home
bias in their financial portfolios. Financial globalization
has made it easier and cheaper to invest in foreign
assets—always an attraction for investors seeking to
diversify their portfolios—while the U.S. productivity
“miracle” of the late 1990s (and more recently) gener-
ated further interest in investing in the United States.
Third, because the U.S. dollar is the dominant interna-
tional currency, central banks in countries that have
been accumulating large current account surpluses
have invested much of their increasing international
reserves in liquid U.S. Treasury securities.
This is the kernel of the optimists’ view. To the extent
that the global imbalances reﬂect ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion, an increased desire to save in countries outside
the United States, and the better economic prospects
of the United States relative to other industrialized
countries, the optimists believe market forces will
automatically correct these imbalances over time. In
this context, the word imbalance carries no negative
connotation.
There is a twist to the story that is peculiar to the
United States, which enjoys what some call an “exor-
bitant privilege” as a result of its central position in
the global economic system. The U.S. dollar is the
dominant medium for international transactions, the
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global markets, and the nominal anchor for many
economies. This confers the advantage of international
seignorage, which some regard as important enough
either to render the U.S. current account deﬁcits sus-
tainable or, at least, to postpone the eventual adjust-
ment into the distant future.
Moreover, almost all of the United States’ liabilities
to foreigners—bonds, stocks, even property—are
denominated in U.S. dollars, while the foreign assets
held by residents of the United States are denominated
in foreign currencies. So when the U.S. dollar falls
against other currencies, its net position improves in
two ways. First, the lower dollar helps to increase U.S.
exports while reducing U.S. imports in the medium
term. Second, foreign assets held by U.S. residents rise
in value(they arenow worth morein U.S.dollars), while
the value of U.S. liabilities to foreigners is unaffected
(since they are priced in U.S. dollars, they are still
worth the same).
For most countries, a current account deﬁcit causes a
deterioration in their net foreign asset position. A net
creditor country is one whose total current holdings of
foreign assets exceed its total current liabilities to for-
eigners. If it runs a current account deﬁcit in a given
year, that shortfall will reduce its net holdings of foreign
assets; it may still be in the black, but less so than a
year earlier. A net debtor country, on the other hand, is
one whose total liabilities exceed its total assets. If it
runs a current account deficit, it will go deeper into
the red as its net foreign liabilities increase. But in the
case of the United States, Gourinchas and Rey (2005a)
show that revaluation effects from the changing value
of the U.S. dollar have, on average, accounted for
about 30 per cent of changes in the net foreign asset
position of the United States. That explains how, even
though the United States ran deficits averaging almost
5 per cent of GDP over the 2001 to 2004 period, the
ratio of U.S. net foreign assets to GDP actually improved.
In addition, the United States has tended to borrow
short and lend long during the post-war era, and U.S.
investors have mainly invested in higher-yielding
equities rather than bonds. The upshot is that the
return on U.S. investments abroad is higher than that
of foreign investments in the United States. The differ-
ential has averaged 3.3 percentage points since 1973
(Gourinchas and Rey 2005b).
The Policy-Failure Story
The pessimists rest their case on ﬁve points, which—at
the risk of caricature—might be summarized as follows.
First, the imbalances—more specifically the U.S. deficit
and the surpluses in China and Japan—reﬂect either
poor policy decisions (the United States) or a lack of
initiative in reforming their economic systems (China
andJapan).Thus,U.S.governmentdeﬁcitsaremaking
the situation worse by reducing national saving. U.S.
monetary policy, by keeping interest rates low for a
substantial period, encouraged the housing boom that
drove home prices higher. Householders who save
less because their homes have become more valuable
are misleading themselves because housing prices
tend to move with income over the long run, and booms
can unwind rapidly. Moreover, the United States is
attracting the bulk of internationally mobile savings,
but these funds are supporting private and public
consumption rather than being channelled into produc-
tive investment.
Tensions created by the large U.S.
trade deﬁcit and the surpluses
elsewhere, notably in Asia, are
leading to calls for increased trade
protectionism to shelter U.S. and
European producers from Asian
competition.
A second view from the pessimists is that financial
markets are confused. Investors and financial analysts,
because their perspective is too short, cannot see that
the imbalances are unsustainable. In effect, their inex-
plicable optimism ﬂows from a poor perception of the
risks involved, so investors are not pricing risk appro-
priately. In light of the boom and bust of stock markets
in the industrialized countries in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, this less charitable view of the wisdom of
ﬁnancial markets cannot be dismissed offhand.
Third, the tensions created by the large U.S. trade
deﬁcit and the surpluses elsewhere, notably in China
and other Asian countries, are leading to calls for
increased trade protectionism to shelter U.S. and
European producers from competition from Asia.
Many are concerned that the steady gains from the
liberalization of international trade since the end of
World War II may grind to a halt. This would add to
the lack of progress in the latest multilateral trade talks,
called the Doha round.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
Fourth, if the markets have got it wrong and trade ten-
sions increase, then the risk of a rapid and disorderly
correction of the imbalances is that much greater. The
fear most often heard is that global investors will grow
increasingly unwilling to finance the U.S. deficit at
current terms. As a consequence, they will purchase
fewer U.S. assets or liquidate part of their U.S.-dollar
portfolios. This would lead to higher U.S. interest rates
andalowerU.S.dollar.HigherU.S.rateswoulddampen
domestic demand in the United States, while the
depreciation of the U.S. dollar would hurt foreign
exports to the United States, notably from Japan and
Europe. Higher U.S. interest rates, in turn, might
dampen the attractiveness of investing in EMEs, causing
difficulties around the world. Overall, world economic
growth would be considerably weaker.
Finally, adding to the pessimists’ anxiety is the fact
that policy-makers in the key countries have not acted
to reduce these tensions. Their assessment that such
inactionwillpersistleadsthemtothegloomyconclusion
that only a crisis—most likely in the form of a sudden
market correction—will resolve the growing imbalances
and that the result will be an inevitable period of eco-
nomic weakness, if not recession.
The Middle Ground
The cautiously optimistic—our third group—remain-
hopeful that market forces will be allowed to do most
of the heavy lifting and that the imbalances will begin
to unwind in an orderly fashion, with a gradual decline
in the U.S. dollar and a smooth shift of expenditure
from the United States to Asia and the oil-exporting
countries.  But they worry deeply that governments
will discourage this development by continuing to
maintain policies that get in the way of market forces.
On the whole, this has been the view of international
organizations that have argued for stronger policy
actions by governments, rather than counting on market
forces alone to solve the problem.
Although they recognize that major imbalances have
persisted longer than expected, despite repeated
warnings that they cannot last, these organizations
continue to make their case that the imbalances are
indeed unsustainable. Rodrigo de Rato, managing
director of the IMF, warned recently (2006) that
“many features of the economic landscape that seem
permanent eventually cease.” He cited the mid-1990s
boom in emerging markets and the technology bubble
in the United States as cases in point. The OECD
takes the view that the U.S. need to borrow from
abroad is driven mainly by the lack of domestic sav-
ings in the United States, rather than the robust
investment demands of its growing economy. The
most fundamental source of low and falling U.S. domes-
tic savings is the household sector, whose saving rate
has been dropping since the early 1980s.
For many years, discussions in international forums
by heads of state, ﬁnance ministers, and governors of
central banks have generally pointed to a number of
policy measures that could be taken to ease the situation.
The United States has been asked to rein in its ﬁscal
deficits. Japan and China have been encouraged to
make faster progress on structural reforms, while
countries in the euro area have been urged to loosen
their labour markets, in both cases to stimulate internal
demand. China has been encouraged to accelerate
reforms to its ﬁnancial system and to let its currency
float (that is, appreciate), which would reduce its grow-
ing trade surpluses; more expensive exports would
reduce China’s reliance on export-led growth, while
cheaper imports would stimulate domestic demand.
China has also been advised that a stronger social
security system would allow its citizens to save less as
a precaution against poor health and a penurious
retirement.
Looking Ahead
So far, however, progress has been limited. One reason
why policy-makers have shied away from taking strong
action is the lack of general agreement on the sustaina-
bility of external deﬁcits, particularly in the case of the
United States. In practical terms, a current account
deﬁcit is sustainable if it can persist over the long run
without triggering signiﬁcant changes in macroeco-
nomic variables (such as a large currency deprecia-
tion) or in public policies (such as smaller government
deﬁcits or greater protectionist measures) to ensure
solvency.Asolventcountryshouldmaintainaperceived
capacity to eventually repay its net foreign debt (with
interest) out of future trade surpluses. In effect, a coun-
try cannot borrow indeﬁnitely to ﬁnance its external
debt. Debtor countries must eventually generate trade
surpluses, and creditor countries, deﬁcits. The prob-
lem is knowing when a country has accumulated too
much debt.
ThisquestionisespeciallygermanefortheUnitedStates.
Its prominence in the global economics system may
delay corrective market forces, so its current account
deﬁcits could conceivably continue for some time yet,
favouring the accumulation of an excessive level of11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
net external debt by the United States. Still, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that these advantages merely
postpone adjustment. An eventual decline in its cur-
rent account deﬁcit—almost all of which can be attrib-
uted to its deﬁcit in the trade of goods and services—
is unavoidable, and the longer the United States delays
correction, the larger the correction must ultimately be.
How Are Large Current Account
Deﬁcits Typically Resolved?
For industrialized countries, current account deﬁcits
typically reverse themselves when they reach about
5 per cent of GDP (Freund 2000). It usually takes about
three years for the accounts to return to equilibrium,
during which time the country’s growth slows and the
value of its currency drops. Investment falls sharply,
while saving in proportion to GDP changes little. At
first, the growth of real (inflation-adjusted) imports
slows, but over time, it is rising real exports that sustain
the improvement. However, it is difﬁcult to draw too
many generalizations from the major studies. Depend-
ing on the approach, the turnaround in a current
account deﬁcit may begin at different thresholds and
may require either a large or only moderate deprecia-
tion of the currency. Higher interest rates, either as a
result of monetary policy interventions or investor
concern, may trigger the reversal. The analysis of the
contribution of ﬁscal policy to the current account def-
icit is inconclusive. It does seem, however, that eco-
nomic growth must slow, and investment is often the
prime mover.
There are enough uncertainties to make predictions
difficult, but it is reasonably safe to say that the U.S.
current account deﬁcit has already crossed historical
thresholds by a signiﬁcant margin, and that the correc-
tion will need to come more from higher household
and public savings, which means government deﬁcits
will have to fall. Because the current account deﬁcit is
associated with strong private consumption and
government spending, any further depreciation of the
U.S. dollar (it has already fallen by almost 15 per cent
since 2002) could be signiﬁcant. A lower-valued dollar
would help to sustain U.S. export growth, while the
tightening in U.S. monetary policy that we have seen
through higher short-term interest rates should encour-
age more domestic saving. However, long rates have
not moved in tandem. This suggests that a possible
trigger for any correction will be a growing reluctance
by foreign investors to increase their holdings of U.S.
assets.  The U.S. current account deﬁcit, then, will not
be corrected by U.S. action alone, butwill require some
reduction in saving by the surplus countries, which, in
turn, will require them to raise their domestic con-
sumption.
This does not dismiss the possibility that a rapid and
disruptive correction could begin in the United States
with what the IMF’s de Rato (2006) recently called “an
abrupt fall in the rate of consumption growth in the
United States, which has been holding up the world
economy.” In this case, the trigger could be a combina-
tion of slowing growth in house prices and a desire by
U.S. consumers to save more, a possibility that has
worried forecasters for some time now. The danger, as
de Rato put it, is that a sudden slowing of U.S. consump-
tion could “take away a major support from world
demand before other supports are in place.”
What Must the Surplus Countries Do?
Countries running surpluses must
invigorate their own domestic
economies so they can make a bigger
contribution to global growth rather
than relying on the United States to
keep the global economy moving.
Many of the countries with current account surpluses
have been criticized no less than the United States for
policy failures that have encouraged the buildup of
surpluses and dampened the domestic demand that
will be needed to prop up the world economy if U.S.
demand falters. A common theme is that countries
running surpluses must invigorate their own domestic
economies so they can make a bigger contribution to
global growth rather than relying on the United States
to keep the global economy moving. Japan and Europe
have been urged to carry out structural reforms to
reduce rigidities in their product and labour markets.
China has been criticized for tightly managing its
exchange rate when its surpluses would drive a ﬂoat-
ing currency much higher. Although China last year
allowed its currency to appreciate by 2.1 per cent and
has taken other moves to promote ﬂexibility in its cap-
ital markets, international organizations continue to
recommend broader policy reforms—not only in China,
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encourage faster growth in domestic demand and
greater exchange rate ﬂexibility. Oil-producing coun-
tries have been urged to mop up some of their surpluses
by investing more at home; in many cases, there is a
pressing need to expand and modernize production
infrastructure, so there is no lack of opportunities for
such investment.
Implications for Growth
How these imbalances are resolved is important for
global economic growth—and for Canada. A decline
in the U.S. current account deﬁcit requires more sav-
ing in the United States, and this would come at the
expense of consumption, the largest source of demand
in the U.S. economy. And since the U.S. economy
accounts for more than one-fifth of the world economy,
a slowdown there would affect all countries. For the
global economy to keep growing at a healthy clip,
other countries would have to pick up the slack. Faster
growth in the major industrialized countries—espe-
cially Europe and Japan—would help, but would not
be enough. The surplus-holding countries of Asia and
the oil-producing countries will have to make a major
contribution to world economic activity by spending
more and saving less, which would reduce their current
account surpluses.
Market forces will encourage this shift, and while a
smooth and orderly transition remains the most likely
outcome, the risk remains that it will be sudden and
disorderly. Financial markets especially have a history
of rapidly changing direction in response to changing
assessments of risk. When that happens—a recent
example is the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia that
spread to Russia and Argentina—the outcome can be
damagingandextendwellbeyondtheoriginalsource.
Financial markets often overshoot, pushing a trend
beyond its reasonable, or sustainable, limits; just as
often, the reversal to correct that error overshoots in
the opposite direction. The longer the current global
imbalances last and the greater they become, the
greater the risk of an extreme reversal.
This risk could be lessened if governments adopted
policies designed to encourage balanced domestic
economic growth. A range of policies would be useful:
a focus on sustainable ratios of public debt to GDP;
the promotion of ﬂexible markets for goods, services,
labour, and capital; the development of strong social
safety nets that would reduce the need for individual
citizens to save large sums as a precaution against job
loss, illness, and penury in old age; and the develop-
ment of financial systems that can offer companies
and households appropriate access to credit. They
could also move to more ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes that would lessen the threat of protectionist
trade measures and encourage economic adjustment
at home.
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